Researchers Detail Remote Unlock Chain for Major Automaker's Connected Cars
Security researchers Shubs and Sam Curry published a technical report describing how a number plate could lead to remote unlocking of vehicles in Australia, with additional findings covering the US and Canada.
Security researchers Shubs and Sam Curry have published a technical report on a major automaker’s connected car platform. They describe a chain of weaknesses that allowed them to remotely unlock any vehicle from the automaker’s two brands in Australia starting from only a number plate. Combined with a separate write-up by Curry, the same remote command capability extended to vehicles in the United States and Canada. All testing was limited to vehicles they owned or had explicit permission to use.
From an Android APK to a Test Harness Admin Tool
The work began by downloading and decompiling the automaker’s Android application. Reconstructing the app’s API requests showed that most traffic went to domains under *.redacted-telematics.com.au. Subdomain enumeration turned up admintool.redacted-telematics.com.au, whose login page carried the title TEST HARNESS.
The JavaScript bundle served with that page contained hardcoded API keys and a full map of admin functionality. Many endpoints required no authentication beyond those keys. The researchers used them to look up user accounts by email, convert a VIN to a subscriber GUID, and pull account details. In Australia, state-based registration lookup services make it straightforward to obtain a VIN from a number plate. That allowed the researchers to link a plate to an account’s personally identifiable information.
Hardcoded OpenIDM Credentials and WAF Bypass
The automaker’s identity platform runs on ForgeRock OpenIDM. An instance at openidm.redacted-identity.com.au was publicly reachable, and direct requests to /openidm/ endpoints were blocked by WAF rules. In a vendor JavaScript bundle under the telematics domain, the researchers found admin credentials for OpenIDM. The credentials were intended for staging, but they also worked against the production instance.
The researchers initially tried a path traversal using /XUI%2f..%2fopenidm/, which returned a 403. That led them to assume all prefixes were blocked. Later they found that /static%2f..%2fopenidm/ was not covered by the WAF at all. That path gave them access to OpenIDM APIs without the servlet routing errors they had seen earlier. A separate custom endpoint, getUser, also had no WAF block and returned password hashes, PIN code hashes, mobile push tokens, and personal information such as phone numbers and full names. The passwords were hashed with PBKDF2-SHA512, but the researchers did not need to crack them to proceed.
Account Takeover, MFA Bypass, and Remote Commands
With OpenIDM admin access, the researchers could PATCH a new password onto any user profile. They then used the Resource Owner Password Credentials flow with the newly set password to obtain an id_token. That token was exchanged for a session token, which was exchanged for a mobile app access token, effectively skipping the multi-factor authentication step. The resulting token had the same scope as a normal consumer app login.
Using the minted token and a target vehicle’s VIN, the researchers sent a door-unlock command to the telematics API. They published a short video showing a script executing the full chain. For Australia, the chain was: plate to VIN, VIN to subscriber GUID, OpenIDM admin credentials to account takeover, ROPC flow to bypass MFA, and finally a remote command call. Curry’s separate write-up describes a more complex chain for the automaker’s US, Canadian, and European environments. The combined findings allowed remote commands such as unlocking and starting engines on any of the automaker’s vehicles in Australia, the United States, and Canada.